

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION**

SECUNDA WILLIAMS-STARR,)	CASE NO. 1: 18 CV 428
)	
Plaintiff,)	JUDGE CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
)	
v.)	
)	<u>OPINION AND ORDER</u>
NORMAHER SHELTER, <i>et al.</i>,)	
)	
)	
Defendants.)	

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J.:

Pro Se Plaintiff Secunda Williams-Starr has filed this civil action against “Normaher Shelter” and “Community Shelter.” (Doc. No. 1.) Although she appears to contest some sort of eviction, her Complaint does not set forth coherent factual allegations or cogent legal claims against the Defendants. Rather, her Complaint consists largely of unclear legal rhetoric. The only relief she appears to seek is for the Court “to surrender [her] payment and free [her] of squatters and the Rico Act Law.” (Doc. No. 1-2.)

Although the standard of review for *pro se* pleadings is liberal, the generous construction afforded *pro se* plaintiffs has limits. *Pilgrim v. Littlefield*, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996). *Pro se* plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are not required to conjure allegations on their behalf. *See Erwin v. Edwards*, 22 F. App'x 579, 2001 WL 1556573 (6th Cir. Dec. 4, 2001). Federal district courts are required, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), to screen all *in forma pauperis* complaints filed in federal court and to dismiss before service any such action the court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim on which relief may be granted, a complaint must set forth sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state claim to relief that is plausible on its face. *Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) governs dismissals under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Although detailed factual allegations are not required, the “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. Additionally, they must be sufficient to give the defendants “fair notice of what [the plaintiff’s] claims are and the grounds upon which they rest.” *Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.*, 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).

Even according the Plaintiff’s Complaint the deference to which a *pro se* pleading is entitled, it does not meet basic requirements or state a claim on which relief may be granted and must be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). The unclear and conclusory statements and sentence fragments set forth in the Plaintiff’s Complaint are insufficient to suggest she

has any plausible federal claim against any Defendant in the case. *See Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ.*, 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996) (a court is not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted conclusions in determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief).

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed *In Forma Pauperis* (Doc. No. 2) is granted, and her Complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court further certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Christopher A. Boyko
CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO
United States District Judge

Dated: May 9, 2018